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I. Introduction 
 A plot of land to call your own, a small town where everybody knows everybody, and 
enough space in-between that you aren’t tripping over your neighbors are images conjured by 
such language as “Rural America” or “Small Community.” To many, living in rural America is 
the very picture of the American dream. In fact, some work their whole lives to achieve this 
ideal.  
Unfortunately, this idyllic lifestyle is being threatened by some recent trends and as a result 
those living in rural regions may soon have to seriously consider whether they are healthy 
enough to live in a rural setting. As the healthcare market forces hospitals to consolidate to large 
population centers, it creates emergency care “deserts” in the areas between those centers. 
Accidents, such as car wrecks and hunting accidents become more dangerous in these “deserts.” 
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Moreover, living in these “deserts” may simply become too dangerous for the elderly and those 
who are already at risk for sudden acute illnesses, such as stroke and heart attack. 
The hospital consolidation trend in our healthcare system has led to worse outcomes for 
patients in rural regions. Healthcare policymakers should take notice of this alarming trend and 
take action to ensure that the market in which these consolidated healthcare providers operate 
matches the externalities they create in rural communities. 
This article will first set the stage by introducing the players in the national healthcare 
market, and describing how those market-forces may be changing and affecting healthcare in 
rural America. Then, we’ll see how the medical community relates distance to hospital and 
likelihood of a good or bad outcome. Next, we’ll take a close look at Chilton County, 
Alabama—a relatively new “emergency care desert” that is neither the first, nor likely the last 
such region. Finally, we’ll examine a few areas of law that may provide a “legal toolkit” that 
could help prevent this problem from spreading, or perhaps reverse the trend. 
 
II. Hospitals are facing enormous market pressure to become part of increasingly 
larger healthcare corporations. 
a. The Healthcare-Provider Corporation 
The Healthcare-Provider Corporation does much what it says: it provides healthcare. This 
comes in the form of owning physical hospitals, employing doctors, and staying stocked with the 
technologies and supplies necessary to carry out that business. These healthcare-provider 
Corporations, like all corporations, have a tendency to take many forms; but they still have a few 
core things in common. In the case of healthcare provider corporations, and for the purposes of 
this article, they are identified by their function. That function is to deliver hospital care. Most 
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physical hospitals are corporations, or are part of a corporation that owns many hospitals. The 
corporate form allows these hospital groups to do a several useful things like lay claim to a larger 
chunk of market power, consolidate resources, and improve efficiency.  
This consolidation of hospitals into larger corporations may be the result of increased cost 
pressure from insurers and the government (who bargain with healthcare providers to set prices), 
the new healthcare law, or the economic downturn in general. Although various rationales have 
been put forth to explain precisely why hospital consolidation exploded in the nineties and why it 
continues today (and there is some debate); the fact that it is happening is clear.
1
 The chart below 
illustrates this principle: 
2
 
Here you see total market concentration (shown as “HHI”—an index) compared to the 
number of mergers and acquisitions per year.
3
 Even though the total number of mergers is in 
decline, the concentration continues to rise. This rise in concentration, insomuch as it causes the 
closure of small hospitals and their emergency rooms, must be slowed or stopped regardless of 
                                                 
1 William B. Vogt, Ph.D. and Robert Town, Ph.D., How Has Hosptial Consolidation Affected the Price and Quality 
of Healthcare (Feb. 2006) available at http://www.rwjf.org/en/research-publications/find-rwjf-
research/2006/02/how-has-hospital-consolidation-affected-the-price-and-quality-of.html. 
2 Id. Chart accompanying article. Original sourced as “American Hospital Association and authors’ calculations”; 
HHI is an acronym for Herfindahl Hirschman Index, an index of the market concentration for inpatient hospital 
services. 
3 Id. 
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its cause. However, the various causes that have been advanced give insight into which 
regulatory and legal actions might be most efficacious in slowing the trend. 
A key, and relatively obvious, reason for consolidation is that when these hospitals team up, 
they can consolidate resources (circle the wagons, so to speak) and they have more of 
everything. This means more CAT scan machines at local hospitals that couldn’t afford them by 
themselves; more market power when the hospital bargains for prices with insurers; more 
doctors in one place
4; “one stop shopping” for the patients and therefore more full beds at each 
hospital. All of this increases efficiency and profits at the hospital, which, at first blush, sounds 
like good news for everybody. But the motivations can, unfortunately, become complicated. 
The corporate structure, or “the firm” as it is sometimes referred, in its highest level of 
abstraction is a model by which returns are increased when individuals work together. 
Everything else equal, competition between actors should regulate the market since each actor 
will make rational choices to their benefit given the information available—this is the Chicago 
school of economics, reduced.
5
 A machine is a common metaphor for the corporate structure. 
Corporations have a duty to make as much surplus as possible for the benefit of shareholders—
almost universally in the form of stock dividends. The corporate machine takes raw materials 
and combines them together to make money as efficiently as possible.
6
 In many ways this is 
good! This reduces waste and drives the hospital’s profits up. Unfortunately market failures like 
                                                 
4 There is some indication that doctors practicing alone are facing pressure to join hospitals in order to remain 
profitable. Shannon Pettypiece, Hospital Medicare Cash Lures Doctors as Costs Increase (Nov. 19, 2012), available 
at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-19/hospital-medicare-cash-lures-doctors-as-costs-increase.html. 
5
 Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago's Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 
870 (2004). It bears repeating that this is the Chicago school at the highest level of abstraction. The economic 
theories derived from the school are varied, in depth, and barely scratched here. There are many great articles on 
healthcare law debating the relative merits of Chicago school and other economic theories such as the one cited here, 
this isn’t one of them. The purpose of this article is to indicate a specific and novel problem—consolidation and 
desertification—that continues to be overlooked, not argue economic theories. 
6 See Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32-33, 122-26. 
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“information asymmetries between patient and physician and the ‘nonmarketability of the 
bearing of suitable risks’ interfere with health care markets achieving optimal resource 
allocation.”7 Given the complexity of medical procedures, alternative treatments, and laws that 
protect personal health information and proprietary pharmaceuticals, it strains credulity to 
believe that patients or insurers have the information necessary to make the best decisions for 
their interest—and this is only one of several market failures that has been advanced.8 As a 
result, patients’, as well as insurers’ and sometimes doctors’ interests are only truly advanced 
when they are the same as the healthcare corporation. As just one example, many insurance 
lobby groups are quick to pick out that when hospital corporations gain market power from 
hospital consolidation, they have a tendency to use that power to get larger payouts from 
insurers, Medicare, and Medicaid.
9
 
 
b. Insurance Companies 
Insurance companies pay healthcare providers for the healthcare on behalf of patients who 
pay the insurers for their service—insurers are sometimes referred to simply as “payors.” Almost 
all of these companies are statewide to national coverers and quite large, but some specific 
factors of that relate to the hospital consolidation trend also cause insurance market failures 
insurers part of the same, poorly self-regulating market.  
Insurance companies, should have a competitive interest to keep prices low for patients. This 
interest should pass up the chain to providers and force them to keep costs down, since rational 
                                                 
7
 Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago's Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 
862 (2004). 
8
 Id. at 864. 
9 The obvious implication from the insurance lobby here is that they are effectively forced to charge those they 
insure more.  Fact Check: Provider Consolidation Drives Up Prices, America's Health Insurance Plan Coverage 
(Feb. 17, 2012), http:// www.ahipcoverage.com/2012/02/17/fact-check-provider-consolidation-drives-up-prices/.  
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insurers should only buy competitively priced care. But costs rise anyway; instead of bargaining 
healthcare prices down, the “bargaining” takes the form of massive (over 50% in some cases) 
discounts for insurance companies.
10
 Equally inflated “charges” are listed by the healthcare 
corporation which are generally only paid by the uninsured, but increasingly are never actually 
paid by anyone.
11
 Transparency and the simple inability of the uninsured to ever pay such prices 
are causing them to be near complete fiction.
12
   
Any small insurer is likely to have trouble bargaining against a large healthcare corporation 
and any large insurer will likely not be able to afford not including the few hospitals that provide 
any one particular service. Moreover, if only one or two hospitals exist within travel distance 
from a remote area, any insurer who wishes to sell in that area virtually must include one as an 
issue of common sense. Some argue that there is functionally no bargaining happening at all.
13
 
Instead of challenging the sellers of healthcare as they grow and consolidate, insurers are simply 
passing along the increased costs to the buyers (mostly employers) who are not organized in any 
substantial way and cannot bargain effectively against large insurance corporations.
14
 
 
c. Medicare and Medicaid 
Medicare and Medicaid together make up nearly half of national spending on medical care.
15
 
This makes the government the largest price setter with the greatest bargaining power in the 
healthcare industry. However, even the biggest players in the healthcare game are subject to 
                                                 
10 Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind A Veil of Secrecy, 25(1) HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 57, 61 (2013). 
11 Id. at 61-62. 
12 Id. 
13 Joseph White, Markets and Medical Care: The United States, 1993-2005, 85(3) THE MILBANK QUARTERLY 395, 
424 (2007). 
14 Id. at 424-425. 
15 Reinhardt, 25(1) HEALTH AFFAIRS at 59-61. 
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some of the same basic forces as private insurers—namely that healthcare corporations set prices 
in a way that is so complicated that it is nearly impossible to assess the actual value of the 
services provided. Moreover, large governmental bureaucracies have a famous and legitimate 
problem moving from the complex scheme of today into some other, radical and more efficient 
scheme.
16
 
 
d.Effect 
 The effect of the insurers’ (both private and public) attempts to raise prices, along with 
other factors, has been the growth of these healthcare corporations. Essentially, when faced with 
threats to their profitability, the corporations have grown. Challenges to this growth came mostly 
in the form of Anti-trust litigation and were mostly unsuccessful.
17
 This has created, as 
mentioned above, fewer but larger healthcare corporations. In no region has this change 
happened more dramatically than The South.
18
  
                                                 
16 See Id. at 68. 
17 Viewed by the court under the Chicago school economic theory, the resistance to hospital corporation mergers has 
been week and judgments have been overwhelmingly in favor of defendants. “The impact of Chicago School 
thinking has been, paradoxically, to encourage merger enforcement at a time when empirical economic analyses did 
not support application of the presumed positive relationship between market concentration and price to hospital 
markets.” More recently, the Chicago School influence has been to retard enforcement by resisting unilateral effects 
analysis, which is best suited to the differentiated product markets that characterize hospital competition. More 
recently the courts have overlooked non-economic factors and were not “receptive to arguments that the 
performance of market participants does not conform to conventional microeconomic assumptions.” 
Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago's Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 
911-915 (2004). 
18 William B. Vogt, Ph.D. & Robert Town, Ph.D., How Has Hospital Consolidation Affected the Price and Quality 
of Healthcare (Feb. 2006) available at http://www.rwjf.org/en/research-publications/find-rwjf-
research/2006/02/how-has-hospital-consolidation-affected-the-price-and-quality-of.html 
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19
 
And these corporations have done the most natural thing for them to do: increase efficiency. 
One of the key ways that they’ve done this (and the focus of this article) is by closing smaller 
“unnecessary” hospitals throughout their systems.  
 An “unnecessary” hospital from the prospective of a corporation is a simple concept. It’s 
one whose business can be more efficiently and profitably absorbed by another hospital in the 
system. In Alabama, and likely in similarly situated geographic regions, this means smaller 
population centers are losing their hospitals to larger population centers. In other words, those 
who live in and around small towns are having to drive to cities; and those who live in more 
distant outlying areas can no longer drive to those towns, but must now drive to quite distant 
cites. Bad news if you live in a small town. Very bad news if you live in the middle of nowhere. 
One example of this alarming trend is the city of Clanton, Alabama. When Clanton lost its 
hospital, the Chilton Medical Center, in October of last year, the community was devastated.
20
 
Many in the community voiced concerns that this would cause a rise in mortality rate due to the 
distance to the nearest hospitals, which were each at least thirty minutes away from town in an 
                                                 
19 Id. Figure accompanying article. Original sourced as “American Hospital Association and authors’ calculations.” 
20 Emily Etheredge, Leaders React to Hospital Closing, CLANTON ADVERTISER, (Oct. 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.clantonadvertiser.com/2012/10/30/leaders-react-to-hospital-closing/. 
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ambulance.
21
 The hospital, which was owned and operated by a large healthcare-provider 
corporation, was reportedly unable to make payroll or unable to reach an agreement with the 
corporation that owned the building and was forced to shut its doors suddenly.
22
 This very 
geographic problem is specific to rural areas. In a densely populated urban area, corporations 
may grow and consolidate their physical premises within the population center without any 
significant change in the average trip time to the hospital; whereas in a more broad area, where 
the population is spread out, the removal of a hospital from one population center and 
consolidation to another has a vastly different effect.  
While the Chilton Medical Center’s closure made economic sense to its parent healthcare 
provider corporation, taking into account profits, stockholders, and market forces. It didn’t make 
common sense to the people of Clanton, Alabama. These people took into account factors like, 
how long a person who is unable to breathe can survive, how many patients an ambulance can 
take to the hospital in a set time period, and the cost to the community of transporting emergency 
personnel to another county to be treated.
23
 It would seem that the fastest possible access to 
critical care for the people who the corporation serves is not part of the corporate agenda, and not 
properly adjusted by the free market—at least in this case. 
 
III.  A Changed Landscape of Healthcare Resources, and a Change in Outcomes. 
a. Outcomes Decrease as Distance to Hospital Increases. 
The gut reaction when the only hospital in town closes is that it presents a health risk. 
Unsurprisingly, medical literature shows a correlation between distance between scene and 
                                                 
21 Id. 
22 Id.  
23 Id. 
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mortality from life-threatening condition.
24
 
25
 In one study, straight-line distances were recorded 
for over 10,000 ambulance rides, and the study showed a correlation between mortality and 
straight-line distance to emergency care.
26
 The study used straight-line distances rather than trip 
time to correct for discrepancies in times recorded and speed drivers chose to travel (which could 
be in part based upon their impression of the seriousness of the patient’s condition); they also 
took measures to adjust for illness severity and threshold for calling for help.
27
 The study showed 
an increase in 10 kilometers of straight-line distance was associated with an over 1% increase in 
mortality among those with life threatening conditions.
28
      
 
29
 
                                                 
24 Jon Nichol, James West, Steve Goodacre, & Janette Turner, The Relationship Between Distance to Hospital and 
Patient Mortality in Emergencies: an Observational Study, 24(9) EMERG. MED. J. 665 (2007). 
25 While not very useful academically, propublica.org released an internet “News Game” based on distance to 
hospital and mortality that suggests, at a minimum, general acceptance of the concept and the 
Nichol/West/Goodacre/Turner data. Sisi Wei, Amanda Zamora & Al Shaw, HeartSaver: Experimenting with News 
Games to Tell a Story, (April 23, 2013) available at http://www.propublica.org/nerds/item/heartsaver-an-
experiment-in-using-news-games-to-tell-a-story. 
26 Nichol, 24(9) EMERG. MED. J. 665. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. Chart created from data figures in article. 
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The study broke the data down even more, noting that respiratory conditions were more 
susceptible, showing a sharper increase in mortality over distance (around 5% per ten 
kilometers), and that chest pain related conditions were slightly less than the 1% per ten 
kilometer mean.
30
 
31
 
  
32
 
The authors of the study concede that there may be an argument that higher volume 
emergency care facilities may offer better care in some capacities and for some conditions and 
that this, if true, may serve as an appropriate reason for closing local emergency care centers—
although they do not have data to back up such a statement.
33
 Some patients, however, 
(especially acute respiratory conditions) need emergency care that would be the same whether 
treated in an emergency room or by a specialist, such as hemorrhage or anaphylactic shock.
34
 
                                                 
30 Id.  
31 The mortality rate data for chest pain related illness were likely corrupted by the availability and public awareness 
of “AEDs” or Automated External Defibrillators. These can reduce mortality significantly where applied correctly. 
Each minute without defibrillation where needed is associated with a 7-10% rise in mortality. These devices can be 
applied before the emergency personnel arrive by bystanders or by the emergency personnel themselves. While such 
a patient is still in desperate need of emergency care and is still affected by the mortality-distance dynamic, the 
variability in scenarios and additional variables (whether or not there were bystanders, time until ambulance arrived 
at scene) makes such patients less useful for our purposes. See Implementing an AED Program, AM. HEART ASS’N. 
(2012) available at http://www.heart.org/idc/groups/heart-
public/@wcm/@ecc/documents/downloadable/ucm_438703.pdf. 
32 Nichol, 24(9) EMERG. MED. J. 665. Figure accompanying article.  
33 Id.  
34 Id. 
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Although the study is observational, similar statistics in other studies have confirmed that 
there is a strong correlation between time or distance to hospital and mortality in respiratory 
cases.
35
 
36
 Other sources suggests that the economy of scale not only fails to improve quality of 
care in emergency rooms, but that it is merely economically beneficial to the hospital and fails to 
improve quality at all.
37
 
 
b. When a Market Change Doesn’t Match a Healthcare Reality, Patients are the Ones Who 
Take the Blow  
Patients are pretty bad at being consumers.
38
 Which is bad news since the ideal market upon 
which Chicago school antitrust analysis depends assumes patients are making informed choices 
as consumers.
39
 A few key issues that make sick patients especially bad consumers. First, being a 
good consumer means making informed decisions and the sick tend to be weak, irrational, 
cloudy headed deciders who don’t understand the product and are forced to rely entirely on the 
doctor (or salesman, to stick to the form).
40
 Second, the pricing system is so very convoluted that 
it is sometimes actually impossible to know the cost of the service until weeks after it has been 
                                                 
35 Jones A.P., Bentham G, Horwell C. Health Service Accessibility and Deaths from Asthma, 28(1) INT. J. 
EPIDEMIOL. 101 (Feb. 1999).  
36 Jones A.P., Bentham G, Health Service Accessibility and Deaths from Asthma in 401 Local Authority Districts in 
England and Whales, 52(3) THORAX 218 (March 1997). 
37 William B. Vogt, Ph.D. and Robert Town, Ph.D., How Has Hosptial Consolidation Affected the Price and Quality 
of Healthcare (Feb. 2006) available at  http://www.rwjf.org/en/research-publications/find-rwjf-
research/2006/02/how-has-hospital-consolidation-affected-the-price-and-quality-of.html 
38
 Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago's Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 
864 (2004). It’s not that people are willfully bad consumers, or that they’re negligent, it’s that there is an 
information disparity that is virtually insurmountable between patients and doctors, between patients and insurers, 
and between patients and healthcare corporations. 
39 Id. 
40 Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace, 
106 MICH. L. REV. 643 (2008). 
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rendered.
41
 The final, and most important issue for our purposes is that patients in need of critical 
care don’t have the right to choose at all.  
 A critical-care patient may have the right to choose their insurance and they may have the 
right to choose specialists within their plan, but they simply cannot create a “market force” on 
the healthcare corporation that will make them maintain nearby emergent care. The issue is 
“walking rights” or the right to not give business. If McDonalds is far away, you don’t drive 
through and McDonalds has to change to get your business; if Whole Foods doesn’t build a store 
in town, you buy non-organic; if there is no emergency room in town, you have a very long 
ambulance ride. You have a long ambulance ride because your other option is dying. This is not 
a situation in which the free market adjusts, it is a situation that requires government intervention 
and regulation. 
c. Case Study: Chilton County 
When the Chilton Medical Center in Clanton closed, the average travel distance to 
emergency room and critical care service jumped. Patients then had to travel to other counties for 
these services. By using Census data, we can look at exactly how much this distance increased, 
who was most affected, and then we can think about how this change might affect outcomes. 
 Chilton County is divided into nine “census tracts.” Each tract has a population between 
two and nine thousand. The population of the county isn’t evenly divided and each tract has a 
unique shape and size. 
                                                 
41 The metaphor used it that it’s like expecting someone to be a good consumer in a clothing store by making them 
fill their cart while blindfolded. Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind A Veil of 
Secrecy, 25(1) HEALTH AFFAIRS 57, (2013). 
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42, 43
 
In addition to population, another bit of data about these tracts is useful to our purpose: 
population centers. This data tells us where the “average person” in each tract lives and gives us 
a point to measure the average distance between an “average person” in that tract and the nearest 
hospital. When we layer these two pieces of data together on a map, several things are apparent: 
first, a few of the population centers are much closer to CMC than they are to any point outside 
the county; second, while the population centers are slightly off geographic center within the 
tracts, their central tendency suggests that the populations are evenly dispersed and the 
population center is a fair estimate of average distance. 
                                                 
42 Chilton County Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/01/01021.html (last visited March 1, 2013). Raw data source. 
43 Demographic Profile - Alabama, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at http://www2.census.gov/census_2010/03-
Demographic_Profile/Alabama/ (last visited March 1, 2013). Raw Data Source. 
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44
  
 Actually measuring the distance between the population centers and the two hospitals 
allows us to quantify the data. To reach the nearest hospital, each of the northern tracts would 
travel to Shelby Baptist Medical Center in Alabaster, Alabama and the southern tracts would 
travel to Prattville Baptist Hospital in Prattville, Alabama. Measuring, we find that new travel 
distances range from 28 to 52 kilometers and an average of about 40 kilometers. Compare that to 
the previous range of 2.4 to 25 kilometers and an average of approximately 12 kilometers. 
                                                 
44This map was created on Google Earth for Mac. It layers data from a free census tract map available through the 
program (Earth Gallery Feature; search: Census Tracts; Map entitled “2010 Census – Total Populations Map”) and 
uses data from these sources: American Factfinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at http://factfinder2.census.gov; 
Demographic Profile - Alabama, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www2.census.gov/census_2010/03-
Demographic_Profile/Alabama/ (last visited March 1, 2013). 
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45
 
This data can be used to determine the change in distance, which, is related to mortality—as 
noted above. While each of the individual distances increased, some increased very significantly.  
46
 
When these numbers are averaged (weighted by population) you find an average increase in 
distance of 26.5 kilometers countywide. These figures are unpleasant at first glance, but become 
                                                 
45 This chart was created using data from Google Earth for Mac. It layers data from a free census tract map available 
through the program (Earth Gallery Feature; search: Census Tracts; Map entitled “2010 Census – Total Populations 
Map”) and uses data from these sources: American Factfinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at 
http://factfinder2.census.gov; Demographic Profile - Alabama, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www2.census.gov/census_2010/03-Demographic_Profile/Alabama/ (last visited March 1, 2013). 
46 This chart is derived from the data on the previous chart. See sources Id. 
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ghastly when compared with the results of the above-mentioned study. An average increase in 
mortality among the critically ill of nearly 3% could be expected county wide with some areas as 
much as a 4.5% increase.
47
 Specific illness groups such as “respiratory problems” and “Injury, 
poisoning, asphyxiation, and hemorrhaging” should see total mortality rates in excess of 20% 
across the entire county—the distances faced by Chilton County residents are all within the 
highest distance group studied.
48
 
 These percentages are likely conservative given the lower general health in Alabama, 
most notably obesity, and the known health hazards that come with it.
49
 
IV. Making the Market Match the Externalities 
Policy makers and stakeholders must take any action available to mitigate the negative 
effects these healthcare corporations are having by changing the market in such a way as to 
encourage more, smaller, and more local hospitals. The remainder of the article will discuss 
methods to remedy these negative externalities. These “tools” could be used independently or in 
concert and represent a model—not only for Chilton County, but other similarly situated regions 
across the country. 
a. Certificates of Need 
Alabama, like many other states, has a Certificate of Need (“CON”) program.50 CON 
programs first became widespread following the federal “Health Planning Resources 
                                                 
47 Jon Nichol, James West, Steve Goodacre, & Janette Turner, The Relationship Between Distance to Hospital and 
Patient Mortality in Emergencies: an Observational Study, 24(9) EMERG. MED. J. 665 (2007). 
48 Id. 
49 S.D.H. Malnick & H. Knobler, The Medical Complications of Obesity, 99 Q. J. MED. 565 (2006). 
50 Certificate of Need: State Health Laws and Programs, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/con-certificate-of-need-state-laws.aspx (last visited April 2, 2013). 
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Development Act” (“HPRDA”) of 1974.51 The idea behind the legislation, and the state 
mechanisms created under it, was that the government could reduce healthcare price inflation by 
taking measures to ensure that an area’s hospitals only had as many beds and equipment as met 
that area’s actual need—if the duplication of service is lower, the logic goes, efficiency is higher 
and price is reduced.
52
 One core problem, which manifests in many ways, is that these savings in 
hospital efficiency are rarely passed along to healthcare consumers. Another core problem, and 
the real concern of this article, is that mere efficiency and reduction in duplicity can lead to bad 
outcomes for healthcare consumers when they are not coupled with factors like access. 
The federal law that mandated and funded these CON programs was eventually repealed in 
1987
53
 and, as a result, state law has become less uniform as far as these programs are concerned. 
Nevertheless, a majority of states still have regulations in place to regulate the healthcare 
industry in this way. The courts should interpret these laws in such a way as to ensure that the 
efficiency at the core of this body of regulations and law is not only financial efficiency, but also 
efficiency of outcomes and access.  
The “mechanism” or regulatory scheme that Alabama developed under HPRDA outlines a 
system of review under which healthcare entities may or may not expand. Entities wishing to 
undertake capital programs, large technology equipment acquisitions, and other expansions are 
either approved or denied upon the decision of the State Health Planning and Development 
Agency (“SHPDA”).54 The decision is based on administrative regulations and the State Health 
Plan (“SHP”), a “comprehensive plan prepared, reviewed, and periodically revised by the 
                                                 
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 See generally Brookwood Health Services, Inc. v. Baptist Health Services, Inc., 936 So.2d 529, (Al. Ct. Civ. App. 
2005). 
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Statewide Health Coordinating Council and SHPDA, and approved by the Governor.”55 
Healthcare Entities submit an application to SHPDA at which point a Certificate of Need Review 
Board (“CONRB”) is created. The CONRB hears evidence and submits an opinion. The 
applicant may then request a “fair hearing” appeal from an administrative law judge. That 
decision then becomes the SHPDA’s final decision.56 That decision is then appealable to the 
Court of Civil Appeals.
57
  
The relevant statutes and regulations in Alabama outline a variety of qualifications and 
findings that must be made by a Certificate of Need Review Board (“CONRB”) and illustrate, 
somewhat clearly, an intent that the CONRB look at the entirety of the situation surrounding a 
hospital which has an interest in expanding.
58
 The CONRB is statutorily mandated to make five 
specific findings before a CON may issue.
59
 If the CONRB is “unable to make any of the five 
findings required by § 22-21-266, then a CON ‘cannot be issued.’”60 Only two of the required 
findings are particularly on point: whether there are alternative, less costly, or more effective 
methods of providing the service”; and whether there is “substantially unmet public requirement 
for the proposed service” including “evidence of locational appropriateness…such as 
transportation accessibility.”61  
                                                 
55 Id.; Alacare Home Health Services, Inc. v. Alabama State Health Planning And Development Agency, 27 So.3d 
1267, 1270 (Al. Ct. Civ. App. 2009) citing to § 22-21-260(13) Ala.Code 1975; Rule 410-2-1-.02, Ala. Admin. Code. 
56 Section 22-21-275(14), Ala.Code 1975. 
57 Alacare Home Health Services, Inc. v. Alabama State Health Planning And Development Agency, 27 So.3d 1267, 
1270 (Al. Ct. Civ. App. 2009). 
58 Section 22-21-264, Ala.Code 1975. 
59 Id. 
60 The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, quoting an earlier case by that same court. The statute being referenced is 
Section 22-21-266, Ala.Code 1975. Alacare Home Health Services, Inc. v. Alabama State Health Planning & Dev. 
Agency, 27 So. 3d 1267 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009). 
61 Section 22-21-264(3)-(4), Ala.Code 1975. 
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The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has held that “less costly, more efficient or more 
appropriate alternatives” may mean that the best alternative is the more efficient use of already 
existing hospital resources. In Humana Med. Corp. v. State Health Planning & Dev. Agency, 460 
So. 2d 1295, 1296 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984), a hospital corporation was seeking a CON for “transfer 
of thirty-one hospital beds from two other hospitals in the same health service area to [the 
corporation] was denied by SHPDA.” The health service area in question was currently operating 
with excess beds to the tune of 160 additional beds.
62
 The hospital bed occupancy rate in the 
service area was less than 80%.
63
 Given those factors the Fair Hearing Officer found that “there 
was a lack of community need for the proposed application, based upon evidence of the 
utilization of existing hospital beds in [the health service area].”64 The Court upheld this decision 
finding that it was not “arbtriary and capricious” and that “[a]pparently, better utilization of the 
existing hospital beds in Huntsville and Madison County would foster cost containment.”65  
This use of the law is not precisely on point with the situation in Chilton County, but it lends 
serious support drawing from its marked similarities. First, the Chilton County closure, and 
similar closures, could perhaps be prevented if a careful foresight and market analysis had been 
utilized at the CON hearings for expansions and bed transfers to the nearby Shelby and Prattville 
Medical Centers. Of course, the ultimate problem here is that market foresight is extraordinarily 
difficult to attain. Second, in cases where the hospital’s business is being transferred to other 
entities in the same system and the facility is being “sold for spare parts,” so to speak, the CON 
                                                 
62 Humana Med. Corp. v. State Health Planning & Dev. Agency, 460 So. 2d 1295, 1297 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
 
65 Id. 
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hearing for the transfer could stand as a gateway to prevent the closure of critically needed 
facilities.
66
 
The regulations give additional clarity to these requirements that tend to support not just a 
legislative intent, but also an administrative intent to ensure that situations like the one in Chilton 
County do not occur. Regarding the requirement of access to the service, the Administrative 
Code indicates that CONRB should ensure that “the medically underserved will receive equal 
access to care” and consider the “means by which a person will have access to the proposed 
services.”67 The section which interprets the “availability of alternatives” language from the 
statute states that “less costly alternatives must be judged against the need for greater 
accessibility, and the impact on the total health care system”68 Finally, but no less importantly, 
the state health plan itself states expressly that “[p]olicy makers must realize that rural facilities 
have fewer health care and political resources than do their urban counterparts and that rural 
hospitals may be one patient away from closing.”69 
The SHPDA and CONRB should interpret the Code of Alabama and the Alabama 
Administrative Code in such a way that it prevents urban hospitals and hospital corporations 
from growing and choking out small rural centers. One alternative to denying growth to such a 
corporation is to compel it to open one or more Freestanding Emergency Departments 
                                                 
66 While the Chilton County case study does not match the hypothetical here created, a fact similar instance can be 
pulled from the headlines. In Long Island, New York, a coalition of doctors, nurses, and concerned citizens have 
banded together and got a restraining order to prevent the closure of a financially troubled, but vital healthcare 
facility. If CON laws are available and properly implemented, then the hospital closure has a clear legal remedy. see 
Denis Hamill, Hamill: Decision not to close Long Island College Hospital a victory of Brooklyn, N.Y. Daily News 
(April 29, 2013) http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/hamill-decision-shut-hospital-victory-article-
1.1330658. 
67 Ala. Admin. Code r. 410-1-6-.07. 
68 Ala. Admin. Code r. 410-1-6-.04. 
69 Ala. Admin. Code r. 410-2-2-.04. 
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(“FEDs”)70 in rural communities. Unlike urgent care centers, FEDs are prepared accept 
ambulances, take critical patients (such as burn victims and critical respiratory illnesses), and 
treat them or stabilize them for transportation to an inpatient facility.
71
 While these facilities are 
normally advanced as a solution to crowding at urban medical center emergency rooms
72
, they 
can be utilized as a win-win for rural areas as well. Alabama’s CONRB has already embraced 
the concept of FEDs in urban areas to reduce not only crowding in urban emergency rooms, but, 
vitally, as a way to reduce transport time to critical care for those Alabamians living on the far 
end of Alabama State Highway 280 (commonly recognized as the most traffic congested 
thoroughfare in the state) under the apparent conclusion that they are too far away from emergent 
care.
73
 The same logic leads suggests that CONRB would make a favorable decision for the 
residents of Chilton County as they are, in almost all instances, further from care. If the CONRB 
made establishment of a FED or the maintenance of an emergency department of a hospital that 
was otherwise being closed a condition of granting the CON to expand or transfer beds, both the 
corporate and public interests would be served.  
Less a novel interpretation of the law, the use of the CON in this way is imperative to the 
spirit of this line of legislation. If SHPDA continues to fail to properly interpret the states CON 
law, the core intent of providing healthcare to the underserved will fail—and the dim future of 
rural healthcare that is already spelled out in the administrative code will continue to become a 
the reality for rural Alabamians. 
                                                 
70 Colin Luke, Free Standing Emergency Rooms: When Do They Make Sense? (2008), 
http://www.birminghammedicalnews.com/news.php?viewStory=1292 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Brookwood Granted CON to Build Freestanding Emergency Room, BROOKWOOD MEDICAL CENTER (July 21, 
2010) http://www.bwmc.com/en-
us/aboutus/hospitalnews/pressreleases/pages/brookwoodgrantedcontobuildfreestandingemergencyroom.aspx 
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b. Federal Anti-Trust Law 
A subset of these cases can be brought as Federal Anti-Trust claims. The basic elements of a 
Sherman Anti-Trust claim are: (1) a contract or conspiracy that (2) unreasonably restricts trade 
(3) in interstate commerce.
74
 Generally, anti-competitive behavior must be between business 
entities (in other words, it must bring together market force); although there are some exceptions 
in the case of interests external to the interest of the business.
75
 The anti-competiveness of said 
behavior must be shown to be in both a product market and a geographic market, as a threshold 
matter.
76
 In other words, a Sherman case exists where more than one entity (or one entity acting 
anti-competitively) reduces competition in one product and geographic market. For our purposes 
that product would be the critical-care and stabilization discussed above and the market would be 
some region reasonably small enough that mortality rates are not substantially affected—about a 
twenty-kilometer radius.  
Unfortunately, this does not apply well to the situation in Chilton County because although a 
large hospital corporation owned CMC, that corporation did not own either of the hospitals to 
which CMC’s patient load would logically divert—they simply lost the business. Moreover, the 
hospitals were not in the twenty-kilometer zone; the closure essentially destroyed the last 
reasonable option (the entire market) in the area. 
The strongest anti-trust cases would exist in situations where the smaller hospital is 
purchased by the system of a nearby hospital (within the same twenty-kilometer zone) and then 
                                                 
74 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
75 see generally Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) for the concept that activity 
within a business generally doesn’t stifle competition; and Nurse Midwifer Associates v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605 (6th 
Cir. 1990) for an example of the exception. 
76 Federal Trade Commission v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999) referencing 57 Fed. Reg. 
41552. 
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closed by that system. Here the buying of the hospital or hospitals and assimilating them into the 
larger system could be making the system anti-competitive even before the larger system began 
closing the smaller hospitals—especially if they are merging services. In Tenant Health Care, 
the 8
th
 Circuit found that the consolidation of two hospitals within the town of Poplar Bluff, 
Missouri was not anti-competitive because the same or better primary and secondary care could 
be found a nearby city.
77
 The Court also found problems with the lower court’s under-
consideration of non-price and other competitive factors.
78
 
The situation is entirely different in a case where time-sensitive critical-care is completely 
evacuated from a region by consolidation. In an emergency care situation, it is difficult to 
imagine that any court would interpret Tenant Health Care as analogous and controlling. Non-
economic factors advanced by the Eighth Circuit, such as patient choice and quality of care, are 
much less persuasive when the patient is unconscious and outcome is tied to the time factor.
79
 
Moreover, economies of scale (another factor the Circuit Court considered) are called into 
question as a quality improver in emergency rooms.
 80
 In the future, courts should look to the 
same totality of non-price related factors such as quality, efficiency, and access when 
determining whether the behavior underlying the creation of healthcare deserts increases 
competition or is actually anti-competitive. 
 One factor that may damage anti-trust cases is the state action doctrine. The state action 
doctrine protects the state from being subject to anti-trust law and applies to private entities when 
they are acting within a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed” state grant to suppress 
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79 Jon Nichol, James West, Steve Goodacre, & Janette Turner, The Relationship Between Distance to Hospital and 
Patient Mortality in Emergencies: an Observational Study, 24(9) EMERG. MED. J. 665 (2007). 
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competition.
81
 The question turns on, essentially, legislative intent. If anticompetitive activity or 
result was the “foreseeable result” of the grant, then the immunity attaches.82  
 In Phoebe Putney, the Supreme Court found the “clear-articulation test” did not 
immunize Georgia’s public hospital corporations when they behaved anti-competitively because 
anticompetitive acquisitions were not a foreseeable result of the Georgia legislation.
83
 This broad 
ruling opens the door for anti-trust liability for Georgia’s public hospital corporations when they 
acquire hospitals anti-competitively. Alabama’s private hospital corporations, following the 
Supreme Courts logic, would be even less likely than Georgia’s public corporations to have state 
immunity based on the CON approval process, which merely ratifies capital projects and does 
not affect acquisitions. 
  
V. Conclusion 
 Rural communities are one of the backbones of our American culture. Alabama, and 
similarly situated states should take proactive steps to prevent the “emergency care deserts” that 
are forming in these already underserved rural communities. Without state intervention, the 
market pressures and internal corporate pressures to increase efficiency and profit are too great 
and lead to the closure of these vital resources. “The essential issue remains, however, that 
without some emergency strategies and relief, the only alternative for the state's rural hospitals 
may be closure.”84 In areas like Chilton County, the data shows that these critical care voids are 
likely to increase mortality—perhaps substantially.  
                                                 
81 Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982). 
82 FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., 568 U.S. ___, 8 (2013). 
83 Id. 
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 The best tool available to combat this trend is the Certificate of Need review process. If 
states interpret the laws they already have appropriately (and in the spirit of the original federal 
legislation) they can manipulate the market to prevent the growth of hospitals that are too big for 
the region they serve while encouraging the maintenance of local hospitals and freestanding 
emergency departments. The critical care and stabilization these entities can provide will 
improve the public health. 
 Anti-trust law may be an avenue that helps reduce the hospital consolidation problem 
overall, but it is a far less precise instrument for specific problem of ensuring access and the best 
possible outcomes for the critically injured. In fact, anti-trust might be best considered as a first 
line of defense; preventing certain unhealthy corporate structures that lead to the hospital deserts 
of concern. 
 When the interests of healthcare corporations produce externalities that harm patients, it 
is incumbent upon the states to act. 
